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The George Washington University
I. WINDS OF WAR? UNCERTAIN TIMES.
On a somber note, the New Year – and new decade – began with another (relatively modest, but still 
anxiety-producing) deployment of troops to the Middle East, following larger deployments during 2019. Con-
ference attendees have become accustomed to the fact that today, federal procurement – of services, goods, 
construction, and research – supports and is critical to every conceivable government (and military) function. 
Yet mobilization (or, with a nod to Section 809 Panel Chair, David Drabkin, a manifestation of war footing) 
tends to draw attention to and crystallize (in the minds of policy-makers, legislators, leaders, and, of course, the 
media and the public) the importance of the acquisition function. See, inter alia, CRS Reviews Latest Overseas 
DOD Contractor Numbers, 61 GC ¶ 151 (noting that “contractor employees accounted for 50 percent or more 
of the total [DoD] presence during recent U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.... [C]ontractors 
have outnumbered U.S. troops in Afghanistan for the past eight years. In 2018, there were more than twice as 
many contractors as U.S. troops in Afghanistan. These contractors provided supplies and services, including 
security, logistical support, weapons, equipment maintenance, intelligence communications, transportation, 
construction and base support operations.”); Heidi M. Peters & Sofia Plagakis, Congressional Research Ser-
vice Report R44115, Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq: 2007-2018 
(Updated, May 10, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44116.pdf. Time will tell what impact, if any, recent 
events will have on defense procurement, defense spending, homeland security, etc. See, e.g., Aaron Mehta, 
Valerie Insinna & David B. Larter, What Soulemani’s death might mean for the National Defense Strategy 
and the next budget, Defense news (January 4, 2020). See also, generally, J. Alex Ward and Victoria Dalcourt 
Angle, Feature Comment: Contracting In The Fog Of War, 61 GC ¶ 120 (noting that, among other things, “if a 
war risk is truly outside the scope of the parties’ agreement, a cardinal change theory might be available[, but 
it is difficult to assert] claims for war risks where the contract shows that the contractor accepted those risks.”)
Against that backdrop, as was the case last year, we’re not particularly confident in predicting what is in 
store for 2020 and beyond. There’s not much precedent for governance while the impeachment process is play-
ing out, in an election year, with the incumbent facing no meaningful competition and, thus, all but assured a 
major party nomination, compounded by a deeply divided legislature. The rapidly spinning news cycle remains 
exhausting, overwhelming, and stressful. Three years into the current administration, we should be fully ac-
customed to the vacancy and turnover rates in high level (e.g., up to, and including, cabinet level), politically-
appointed leadership. (On a positive note, we currently have both an Administrator of the Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy, Michael Wooten, and a Secretary of Defense, Mark T. Esper.) Yet it seems quaint to aspire 
to stable leadership and staffing, reliable appropriations and program funding, and proactive, meaningful, ef-
ficient long-term reform. All of which only increases anxiety in the government contracting policy and practice 
spheres, because uncertainty and instability threaten or undercut, among other things, efforts to engage in 
effective tradeoff analyses and planning, making efficient, long-term investment decisions, maintaining healthy 
contractual relationships, proactively investing in hiring, developing, and training personnel (needed today 
and in the future), while, instead, permitting a regressive overemphasis on cost savings rather than focusing 
on programmatic outcomes as a principal goal of the acquisition process. None of which breeds optimism.
II. NEW ELECTRONIC TOOLS … AND ACRONYMS: A NEW GPE, AND SAMMI’S. 
Although none of it was unexpected, last year prompted an unusual number of technology-based 
changes to some of the most fundamental ways that we do business.
Reprinted from Thomson ReuTeRs GoveRnmenT ConTRaCTs YeaR In RevIew CoveRInG 2019 ConfeRenCe BRIefs, 
with permission of Thomson Reuters. Further use without the permission of the publisher is prohibited. For 
more information or to subscribe, call 1-800-328-9352 or visit http://legal.thomsonreuters.com.
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A. Governmentwide Point of Entry (GPE)? RIP FedBizOpps? On 
November 12, the General Services Administration (GSA) announced that: “Ef-
fective [today], FBO.gov [Federal Business Opportunities] is retired, and Beta.
SAM.gov is now the authoritative source for Contract Opportunities. Visit the 
Learning Center for videos, FAQs and other information!” Alas, the transition 
may not have been as smooth as GSA anticipated. For example, as of the first 
of the calendar year, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 2.101 definition 
of Governmentwide point of entry (GPE) still pointed to FedBizOpps, www.fbo.
gov, which led to the page that explained: “FBO.gov has been moved to beta.
SAM.gov and is now known as Contract Opportunities. beta.SAM.gov is now 
the authoritative location for finding contract opportunities.” Is anyone else 
troubled that the official, central, mandatory repository and access point for all 
things federal procurement – relied upon by government officials and contrac-
tors (domestic and foreign) was launched in beta mode and still bears a beta 
moniker? As GSA explains: “The beta.SAM.gov domains contain data that has 
been migrated from our legacy systems. The domains support two distinct types 
of federal awards: acquisition and federal assistance.” FAR 2.101 also currently 
states that the “Single, Governmentwide point of entry,” means the one point of 
entry to be designated by the Administrator of OFPP that will allow the private 
sector to electronically access procurement opportunities Governmentwide.” 
B. Goodbye DUNS, Hellos SAMMI’s. Through a related yet different 
initiative, GSA is transitioning from its long-term, exclusive reliance on the 
(Dun & Bradstreet (D&B)-based) Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) 
as the Unique Entity Identifier (UEI) for contractor identification and registra-
tion in the System for Award Management (SAM). Contractors (and prospective 
contractors) will now self-identify using the far more fun-to-say SAM Managed 
Identifiers (SAMMI’s), with Ernst & Young initially providing the validation 
services. These newfangled SAMMI’s, of course, should not be confused with the 
oh-so-coveted Sammies (or Samuel J. Heyman Service to America Medals), known 
in federal circles as the “Oscars” of government service. See, generally, https://
servicetoamericamedals.org/about/. Developments In Brief: GSA Begins Transition 
from DUNS Numbers to SAMMI, 61 GC ¶ 93(a); https://www.gsa.gov/about-us/
newsroom/news-releases/gsa-announces-award-for-entity-validation-services; see 
also, Done with DUNS, https://gsa.federalschedules.com/blog/done-with-duns/. 
C. What’s Next? The Electronic Marketplace Initiative. In tangentially 
related news, in 2020, we’ll be watching GSA’s developmental efforts regarding 
the electronic marketplace initiative, pursuant to Section 846 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for FY 2018, Public Law No. 115-91, 41 U.S.C. § 1901 
note. This topic is discussed at greater length, in Chris Yukins’ materials found 
at Chapter 2. See also, Christopher Yukins, Feature Comment: U.S. Government 
To Award Billions Of Dollars In Contracts To Open Electronic Marketplaces To 
Government Customers—Though Serious Questions Remain, 61 GC ¶ 303 (“It 
is difficult to gauge how large these electronic marketplaces may grow. ... The 
new electronic marketplaces thus may ‘swallow’ a large portion of the bottom 
tiers of the $550 billion federal market.”); see also GSA Commercial Platforms 
Initiative, https://interact.gsa.gov/group/commercial-platforms-initiative. 
III. NEW LEADERSHIP AT THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL  
PROCUREMENT POLICY; THE ACQUISITION  
WORKFORCE (AND OTHER PRIORITIES). 
A. Finally, An OFPP Administrator. Following an August 1 Senate 
confirmation vote, for the first time since September of 2016 (a gap just short 
© 2020 Thomson Reuters
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of three years), the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) is again be-
ing led by a Senate-confirmed administrator, Michael Wooten. We applaud 
the administration’s appointment, turning to someone with experience from 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU), senior service in the District of Co-
lumbia’s procurement office, and, among other things, military service (as a 
Marine). Developments: President Nominates OFPP Head, 61 GC ¶ 55(c). Seen 
as a largely apolitical appointee, in addition to emphasizing his commitment 
to the acquisition workforce, Administrator Wooten has among other things, 
referred to initiatives intended to leverage the government’s buying power 
(through, e.g., category management), sharing market intelligence, data (in-
cluding performance assessment and artificial intelligence), cybersecurity 
(addressed at greater length in Chapter 16 of these materials), and seeking 
to innovate and generate cost efficiency. See also, Vernon J. Edwards, At Long 
Last: A Nominee For Administrator Of Federal Procurement Policy, 33 N&CR 
¶ 17 (Vern suggested that, for various reasons, including his late-in-the-
administration nomination and confirmation, the new Administrator could 
“identify some long-standing policy issues and set people to work developing a 
set of discussion papers that could be the foundation for future policy analyses 
and initiatives” or, maybe “should spend his term going around and talking 
to people, in the style of Steve Kelman, asking about what concerns them, 
soliciting input, and trying to prepare us all to talk and discuss when times 
are less fraught.” Among other things, Ralph Nash added “the dire need for 
thinking about contracting for services.”)
B. Focus on the Acquisition Workforce. Of course, Administrator 
Wooten has been clear in his interest in strengthening and supporting the 
acquisition workforce. There’s plenty to keep him busy, and a sampling of 
issues (other than counting full-time-equivalents or FTE’s) might include: 
• Gaps? See, generally, DOD Acquisition Workforce Has Gaps in Busi-
ness Acumen, but Extent Is Unclear, 61 GC ¶ 187(c); Laura Werber, et al., An 
Assessment of Gaps in Business Acumen and Knowledge of Industry Within the 
Defense Acquisition Workforce (“[T]he lack of standardized definitions obscures 
the need for knowledge related to business acumen, industry operations, 
and industry motivation, and while knowledge gaps appear to exist in these 
areas, the lack of requirements and desired proficiencies further hinders an 
estimation of the gaps’ extent.” Among other gaps, the report addresses risk 
management, earned value management, financial practices, supply chain 
management, small business, agile development, cybersecurity, knowledge 
of incentives that drive corporate decision-making, and “other important 
types of business-related knowledge: negotiation, developing and under-
standing requirements, and cost and price analysis.”), www.rand.org/pubs/
research_reports/RR2825.html. (Along those lines, on April 22, 2019, the Board 
of Standards Review of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 
accredited the National Contract Management Association’s (NCMA’s) Con-
tract Management Standard™ (CMS™) as an American National Standard 
(ANS). At some point, it would be interesting to see DAU, FAI, and NCMA 
make a concerted effort to align their professional standards.)
• Hiring, Recruiting, Outsourcing? Administrator Wooten may also 
be interested in how agencies exploit hiring flexibilities and do (and don’t) con-
tinue to outsource the procurement function. See, e.g., DOD Should Monitor 
Use Of Acquisition Workforce Hiring Flexibilities, 61 GC ¶ 248 (GAO reported 
that, for fiscal years 2014 through 2018, “DOD used hiring flexibilities for 90 
percent of its approximately 44,000 civilian acquisition workforce hiring ac-
NOTES
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tions,” then raised that figure to 95 percent in FY 2018); GAO-19-509, Defense 
Acquisition Workforce: DOD Increased Use of Human Capital Flexibilities 
but Could Improve Monitoring, www.gao.gov/assets/710/700927.pdf; Indus-
try Group Suggests Limiting USAID Use Of Contractor COs, 61 GC ¶ 243 
(referencing the USAID proposal “to designate personal services contractors 
(PSCs) and cooperating country national (CCN) PSCs as USAID warranted 
contracting officers and agreement officers”); 61 GC ¶ 189(d) (“The proposed 
rule would amend the USAID Acquisition Regulation (AIDAR) to ‘address 
a shortage of U.S. direct-hire staff ’ and to ‘bolster the Agency to succeed in 
terms of building long-term, host country technical capacity to materially 
assist the Missions with procurement responsibility.’”); 84 Fed. Reg. 27745 
(June 14, 2019). See also, Air Force, DOD Face Challenges Establishing New 
Space Agencies, Witnesses Testify, 61 GC ¶ 114; DOD Does Not Know Scope Of 
Space System Acquisition Workforce, 61 GC ¶ 92; GAO-19-240, Defense Space 
Systems: DOD Should Collect and Maintain Data on Its Space Acquisition 
Workforce, (“DOD does not routinely monitor the size, mix, or location of the 
military and civilian workforce supporting its space-related acquisition pro-
grams.”) https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-240.
• Industry Exchange Programs? We agree with those clambering 
for increased government-industry exchange programs. DBB Urges More 
Industry-Government Personnel Exchanges, 61 GC ¶ 203 (DOD “would 
benefit from exchange programs which explore streamlined, nontraditional 
pathways to bring critical skills into service, expanding access to outside 
expertise, and devising new public-private partnerships to work with small 
companies, start-ups, and universities.”), DBB FY 19-01, Defense Acquisi-
tion Industry-Government Exchange: Recommendations to reduce barriers to 
industry-government personnel exchanges, https://dbb.defense.gov/Reports/; 
see also, DOD Industry Exchange Program (IEP) (“groundbreaking program 
will serve as a platform for DOD and private sector participants to (a) gain a 
better understanding of, and perspective on, each other’s business operations 
and challenges, and (b) share innovative and cost-saving practices.”), https://
asc.army.mil/web/career-development/programs/dod-iep/.
• A Different Perspective: Administrator Wooten might also take 
to heart (with a grain of salt, of course) Vern Edwards’ unvarnished assess-
ment of most of the current workforce initiatives. Vernon J. Edwards, Sad 
Commentary: Rules, Or The Lack Thereof, Won’t Make Acquisition Agile And 
Innovative, 33 N&CR ¶ 5 (emphasis added):
We do not need reform. We need a paradigm shift. The Government 
cannot fix acquisition and make the contracting process more 
agile, innovative, and responsive to mission needs by writing and 
revising rules, publishing slogans, and demanding ever more 
status and progress reports. It needs a smart, professionally 
educated, well-trained, and motivated workforce that is 
steeped in concepts and principles, instead of rules, and able 
to ply them in order to get things done…. Create a National 
Acquisition Academy and educate and develop cadres of senior 
executives who will go out to the field and remake acquisition. Stop 
enacting procedurally prescriptive laws and regulations that set 
protest traps….
 Real progress toward making acquisition more agile and innovative 
and responsive to our dire national security situation will begin 
when the bureaucratic powers see for themselves, and convince 
Congress, that the time has come to (1) develop a truly professional 
© 2020 Thomson Reuters
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acquisition workforce and (2) rethink their 19th century ideas about 
how acquisitions should be done....
C. No Shortage of Items On the Menu: The Section 809 Panel. We 
have now had a year to digest the extensive (and, gratifyingly, well-written 
and accessible) final Section 809 Panel report. (Recall that NDAA Section 809 
for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, required the Secretary of Defense 
to establish an advisory panel on streamlining and codifying acquisition 
regulations. The massive study panel generated prodigious amounts of work 
(and ideas) related to five target areas: (1) establishing and administering 
appropriate buyer and seller relationships; (2) improving the functioning 
of the system; (3) ensuring the continuing financial and ethical integrity 
of defense procurement programs; (4) protecting the best interests of DoD; 
and (5) eliminating any regulations that are unnecessary for the purposes 
described.) See generally, https://section809panel.org. We’re confident that, 
if Administrator Wooten runs out of ideas or initiatives, there are plenty 
of thought-provoking panel recommendations (with, of course, voluminous 
supporting research) that Congress has not yet addressed. Section 809 Panel 
Recommends Broad Reforms To DOD Acquisition System, 61 GC ¶ 29.
D. Consider Metrics (or Performance Measurement). We continue 
to hope for acquisition leadership that, rather than obsessing about (often 
artificially) low prices, will focus on, among other things, value for money, 
customer satisfaction, and life cycle cost (or total cost of ownership). In other 
words, we hope Administrator Wooten turns the lens to what matters to re-
quirements generators and agency heads, rather than what’s easy to measure 
or what’s emphasized by pre-existing legal regimes (such as, for example, 
Nunn-McCurdy breaches). See, e.g., Moshe Schwartz & Charles V. O’Connor, 
Congressional Research Service Report R41293, The Nunn-McCurdy Act: 
Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress (May 12, 2016) (“The Nunn-
McCurdy Act (10 U.S.C. § 2433) requires the Department of Defense (DOD) to 
report to Congress whenever a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) 
experiences cost overruns that exceed certain thresholds.” One wonders as 
to the utility of this dominant metric when, as CRS acknowledges: “Unreal-
istically optimistic cost estimates [an all-too-frequent occurrence] can make 
future cost growth almost inevitable, setting the stage for future Nunn-
McCurdy breaches.”), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41293.pdf. It’s a steep 
hill to climb (but our sense is that former DUSD(AT&L) Frank Kendall laid 
at least some of the groundwork with his annual performance assessments). 
For a cautionary note, however, see, generally, RAND Highlights Challenges 
To DOD Use Of Data Analytics For Acquisition, 61 GC ¶ 251, Philip S. Anton, 
et al., Assessing the Use of Data Analytics in Department of Defense Acquisi-
tion (RAND 2019), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB10085.html. 
Among other things, RAND notes that, while “DoD has made progress in 
improving its data and analytic capabilities[, …] data governance is matur-
ing, and pockets of analytic capabilities exist[,… a]ttempts to apply more-
advanced commercial data analytics approaches to DoD acquisition data are 
just beginning.” Further (with emphasis added):
• Some of the biggest barriers to expanding and refining the use of 
data analytics in the acquisition sphere include the lack of data 
sharing because of cultural, security, and micromanage-
ment concerns; inconsistent data access across the DoD and for 
FFRDCs and support contractors; and difficulty installing modern 
analytic software because of security concerns.
NOTES
© 2020 Thomson Reuters   13-6
• Long-term investments and strategic planning are needed 
— both for data governance and for analytic capabilities — as 
well as concerted efforts by Congress and the DoD to address the 
culture of not sharing data.
• Expectations of what data analytics can do for DoD acquisi-
tion need to be moderated. Most of the problematic programs 
examined had issues stemming from strategic acquisition deci-
sions rather than from a lack of data analytics; data analysis may 
or may not be equally weighted against other factors that DoD 
leadership must consider when making decisions.
No one said it would be easy. This year reminded us that there’s always 
another data point demonstrating the difficulties DOD (and, more broadly, 
government agencies) face(s) with regard to data-driven decision-making. 
Consider, for example:
• DoD’s experience with contractor business system reviews. DCMA 
Needs To Track Contractor Business System Reviews, 61 GC ¶ 43; GAO-19-212, 
Contractor Business Systems: DOD Needs Better Information to Monitor and 
Assess Review Process, www.gao.gov/assets/700/696801.pdf (“DOD currently 
lacks a mechanism based on relevant and reliable information, such as the 
number of [contractor business system] reviews that are outstanding, the 
risk level assigned to those systems, and the resources available to conduct 
such reviews....” Not surprisingly, among other things, too few reviews have 
been conducted “due, in part, to the need for [DoD] to reduce its backlog on 
completing incurred cost audits.”) 
• DoD’s inability to track or validate promised energy savings. DOD Can-
not Determine ESPC Savings, Benefit, 61 GC ¶ 53; Report DODIG-2019-058, 
Summary and Follow-up Report on Audits of DoD Energy Savings Perfor-
mance Contracts, (February 14, 2019) (In summarizing eight prior GAO, 
DoD OIG, and Army Audit Agency reports, the DOD IG found that, despite 
acknowledged progress, “the Government did not know whether it received 
contractor-claimed energy savings and whether the ESPC program was 
cost effective.”), https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/19/2002090670/-1/-1/1/
DODIG-2019-058.PDF. 
• Nor should we expect OT’s (discussed at greater length below) to tell 
a different story. DOD Lacks Reliable Data On OTA Use, CRS Says, 61 GC ¶ 
66 (CRS cautioned that current data “may not accurately reflect the extent 
to which nontraditional contractors are engaged in OT agreements. … Other 
analysts … suggested that DOD does not accurately and consistently track 
OTA data….”), Moshe Schwartz & Heidi M. Peters, CRS Report R45521, De-
partment of Defense Use of Other Transaction Authority: Background, Analysis, 
and Issues for Congress, (Updated February 22, 2019) https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
natsec/R45521.pdf. 
Low hanging fruit? Maybe the best starting point is small and simple, 
something as easy as trying to learn from prior experience. GAO: KC-46 Tanker 
Should Issue Lessons Learned For Fixed-Price Development Contracts, 61 GC ¶ 
174; GAO-19-480, KC-46 Tanker Modernization: Aircraft Delivery Has Begun, 
but Deficiencies Could Affect Operations and Will Take Time to Correct, (DoD 
“should ensure that the KC-46 program office disseminates insights … [regard-
ing the] contracting and sustainment planning experiences for consideration 
by acquisition programs, in particular those considering a fixed-price-type 
development contract or a commercial derivative aircraft.”), https://www.gao.
© 2020 Thomson Reuters
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gov/products/GAO-19-480. In a different context, but poignantly reminding 
us of the need to learn from experiences rather than simply repeat them, see 
Vernon J. Edwards, A. Ernest Fitzgerald, The C-5A, and Acquisition Innova-
tion: What Lessons Can We Learn?, 33 N&CR ¶ 21:
The C-5A story shows us that acquisition is not just a process 
governed by laws and regulations and conducted by people working 
in bureaucracies, and it is far more complex than mere rules and 
contracts. It is an intricate and dynamic political, social, and 
economic system of bureaucracies, individuals, personalities, world 
views, cultures, superstitions, mythologies, pathologies, dogmas, 
concepts, vague notions, principles, and policies, all circumscribed 
by energy fields of genius, stupidity, indifference, criminality, time, 
and chance. You cannot just tinker with a specification of this or that 
facet of the system and hope to make the system behave the way 
you would wish. Anyone who thinks that statutes, regulations, and 
the application of “sound” management practices and procedures 
can “fix” acquisition simply does not understand the problem.
It’s a big government; and challenges differ. At the same time, let’s be 
clear that DoD is well ahead of many civilian agencies on some of these topics, 
although some, including GSA, appear to be making investments with an eye 
towards more strategic decision-making. DOE Should Improve Contractor 
Cost Performance Reporting, GAO Says, 61 GC ¶ 64; GAO-19-5, Department 
of Energy: Performance Evaluations Could Better Assess Management and Op-
erating Contractor Costs, (although, in a perverse sort of way, we are inclined 
to applaud DOE to the extent that their “reports provided less information 
on M&O contractors’ cost performance than on contractors’ technical and 
administrative performance....” Yes, cost performance matters, but shouldn’t 
we prioritize contract completion, customer satisfaction, and achievements 
such as “production progress” and “scientific discoveries?” Is comparing the 
number of pages for each type of analysis meaningful?), https://www.gao.gov/
products/GAO-19-5. See also, MAS Transactional Data Reporting Has Limited 
Use, Imposes Significant Burden, Industry Group Warns, 61 GC ¶ 226 (among 
other things, “in today’s dynamic marketplace prices can change daily, and 
agencies using the data may make erroneous comparisons because of outdated 
information. These misunderstandings could slow negotiations and increase 
the administrative costs for contracts…. [To the extent that] TDR does not 
provide meaningful data related to the quality of the item[, the] system drives 
the Government towards decisions made on the lowest price, regardless of 
the other criteria that impact a buying decision.”) Coalition for Government 
Procurement Comments (July 29, 2019) http://thecgp.org/images/Coalition-
TDR-Final-Comments-7-29-19.pdf. See also, GAO Questions Post-Disaster 
Contract Tracking, 61 GC ¶ 130; GAO-19-281, 2017 Disaster Contracting: 
Actions Needed to Improve the Use of Post-Disaster Contracts to Support Re-
sponse and Recovery, (“the full extent of post-disaster contracting related to 
the 2017 disasters is unknown”), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-281. 
Finally, to the extent we’re addressing data, it’s impossible not to mention one 
of the year’s stranger stories. DATA Act Pilot Failed To Assess Reduction In 
Contractor Reporting Burden, 61 GC ¶ 134 (Unlike grantees, “[n]o contractors 
participated in a voluntary pilot program for a centralized procurement data 
portal....[OMB] still does not have information from stakeholders that could 
help inform the expansion.”); GAO-19-299, Pilot Effectively Tested Approaches 
for Reducing Reporting Burden for Grants but Not for Contracts; https://www.
gao.gov/products/GAO-19-299. 
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IV. NUMBERS, THE BURN RATE, PROCUREMENT DATA: WHAT 
TO MAKE OF VARIOUS TRENDS?
A. Better Late Than Never: The Money Keeps Flowing. Although 
we began calendar year 2019 in (a sustained) shutdown, continuing resolu-
tions and pre-Christmas legislation largely averted a repeat for Fiscal Year 
2020. But see Subcommittee Report Highlights Government Shutdown Costs, 
61 GC ¶ 276 (Senate Committee survey “suggests that the three most recent 
Government shutdowns—in fiscal years 2014, 2018 and 2019—cost taxpay-
ers at least $3.7 billion in back pay to furloughed workers and at least $338 
million in other costs such as lost revenue, administrative work and late fees 
on interest payments[.]”); President Signs Continuing Resolution, Industry 
Group Offers Shutdown Guidance, 61 GC ¶ 286; PSC Offers Guidance to 
Mitigate Effects of a Government Shutdown (September 23, 2019), https://
www.pscouncil.org/a/News_Releases/2019/PSC_Offers_Guidance_to_Miti-
gate_Effects__of_a_Government_Shutdown.aspx. For a less gloomy (but 
transparently uncertain) perspective, see Report Finds Mixed Evidence Of 
Harm From Continuing Resolutions On DOD Weapon Contracts, 61 GC ¶ 21; 
Stephanie Young & J. Michael Gilmore, RAND, Operating Under a Continuing 
Resolution: A Limited Assessment of Effects on Defense Procurement Contract 
Awards, www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2200/
RR2263/RAND_RR2263.pdf (“The results of our analysis are mixed. They do 
not provide strong evidence that CRs are causing delays and cost increases; 
because of their limitations, however, our results also do not provide defini-
tive evidence that such negative effects are not occurring.”). 
B. Are the Boom Years Here to Stay? Unlike most of the past decade, 
the procurement dollars seem to be flowing relatively freely (despite prodi-
gious deficit spending), and procurement spending appears, once again, to be 
on the rise. Fiscal 2018 procurement spending, at $559 billion, was the third 
consecutive annual increase, increasing by $46.3 billion over the previous year 
and representing the largest number since $562 billion in FY2010. See, e.g., 
Bloomberg Government, BGOV200: Federal Industry Leaders 2019, https://
about.bgov.com/bgov200/. Last year’s chapter indicated our curiosity with 
regard to USASpending.gov’s new DataLab (still in Beta), and we had high 
hopes to the extent that it offered a broad range of eye-catching graphics and 
insights. (Among other things, we discussed, at length the feature: Contract 
Spending Analysis: How has federal contract spending changed over time?) 
Alas, that section does not appear to have been updated in the last year (and 
appears to have been frozen at March 31, 2018; yes, that’s 2018, not 2019). 
Meanwhile, consistent with past experience that most concatenated federal 
procurement data should be viewed with some amount of skepticism, GAO 
highlighted that: “The amount of foreign end products purchased could be 
greater than reported in FPDS-NG … due to reporting errors and system 
limitations….” GAO Finds Inconsistent Buy American Guidance, Inaccurate 
Procurement Data, 61 GC ¶ 2; GAO-19-17, Buy American Act, Actions Needed 
to Improve Exception and Waiver Reporting and Selected Agency Guidance, 
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-17.
C. Growth Below the Radar: High Volume, Lower Dollar Procure-
ment: Waiting for the New Micro-purchase and Simplified Acquisition 
Thresholds. Last year we suggested that one of the year’s most dramatic policy 
and practice changes – in terms of impacting the broadest segment of the acqui-
sition community and the private sector – would fly largely under the radar, … 
and that was the whole point. Pursuant to the 2019 National Defense Autho-
© 2020 Thomson Reuters
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rization Act (NDAA), Section 821, the micro-purchase threshold experienced 
a dramatic, greater-than-inflation-adjusted, statutory bump, up to $10,000 for 
all agencies (including DoD). Congress Passes FY 2019 NDAA, 60 GC ¶ 241. We 
noted that we’ve come a long way since the late 1990’s, when the micro-purchase 
authority was established, as part of the reform and streamlining movement, and 
dramatically expanded reliance on the Governmentwide commercial purchase 
card (yes, the then-nascent Government charge card). DoD Gears Up for Simpli-
fied Micropurchases, 40 GC ¶ 192. Also, the statutory simplified acquisition 
threshold was slated to increase Government-wide from $150,000 (which has 
been inflation adjusted) to $250,000. As of the new year, however, neither the 
default micro-purchase nor the simplified acquisition thresholds in the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR 2.101) had been fully implemented (or increased). 
Proposed Rule To Raise FAR Simplified Acquisition, Micro-purchase Thresholds, 
61 GC ¶ 308 (“The proposed rule would also ‘replace non-statutory, stated dollar 
thresholds that are intended to correspond with the MPT and SAT, with the text 
‘micro-purchase threshold’ and ‘simplified acquisition threshold.’ This change 
‘will ease maintenance of regulations, given the likelihood of future changes to 
the threshold amounts,’ the proposed rule states.”); 84 Fed. Reg. 52420 (Oct. 2, 
2019); FAR Micropurchase And Simplified Acquisition Thresholds Raised For 
Emergency, Cyberattack Response, 61 GC ¶ 147.
D. More Other Transactions Activity? Although they still do not ac-
count for a statistically significant percentage of federal procurement dollars, 
reliance on other transactions appears to be increasing. From FY 2016 through 
2018, the “total number of new prototype other transactions increased five-fold 
from 34 to 173[,]” and “obligations made on prototype other transactions nearly 
tripled from $1.4 billion to $3.7 billion.” One of many unique nuggets that the 
report unearthed was that: “The Army was responsible for over two-thirds of 
the new awards and actions made from fiscal years 2016 through 2018—val-
ued at nearly $5.3 billion—but some of these were awarded on behalf of other 
DOD components, such as the Air Force, Navy, and Defense Innovation Unit.” 
GAO-20-84, Defense Acquisitions: DOD’s Use of Other Transactions for Prototype 
Projects Has Increased (November 22, 2019); DOD’s Other Transactions Usage 
Has Significantly Increased, GAO Finds, 61 GC ¶ 356. Of course, that doesn’t 
mean that OT practice has been standardized or optimized; it’s still evolving. 
Richard Dunn, Feature Comment: Thirty Years of Other Transactions, 61 GC ¶ 
347 (“[A]n alternative acquisition system based on OTs is overdue. It is time 
to create the new system, not merely view OTs as ‘just another tool.’ Let the 
two systems [OT’s and the traditional acquisition system] operate in parallel 
and make judgments once adequate comparative data have been gathered and 
analyzed.”). See also, Ralph C. Nash, Protesting Other Transactions: District 
Court Jurisdiction, 33 N&CR ¶ 39 (asserting that “competitors for OT contracts 
should have some place to go to ensure that the agency has followed the rules 
and treated the offerors fairly. Until Congress decides otherwise, that is now 
the district court.”); Ralph C. Nash, Postscript: Other Transactions, 33 N&CR 
¶ 1 (“While OT contracts are the current solution to many problems, there is 
still a lot to be learned. Thus, the entire process is a laboratory project.”).
E. Fewer Bid Protests? The volume of GAO bid protests again declined 
in FY 2019, and the single-year decrease was far more significant (at sixteen 
percent) than typical fluctuations (in either direction, of under ten percent). 
The number of protests filed, 2,198, is markedly down from the recent high of 
2,789 in FY 2016 (and, of course, a far cry from the 1993 of peak of more than 
3,300 protests). GAO Bid Protest Sustain Rate Drops Again As Number Of 
Cases Filed Drops In FY 2019, 61 GC ¶ 328; GAO-20-220SP, GAO Bid Protest 
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Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2019 (November 5, 2019) (“[T]he 
most prevalent reasons for sustaining protests during the 2019 fiscal year 
were: (1) unreasonable technical evaluation; (2) inadequate documentation of 
the record; (3) flawed selection decision; (4) unequal treatment; and (5) unrea-
sonable cost or price evaluation.”); Jerald S. Howe, Jr., James J. McCullough, 
Michael J. Anstett & Anayansi Rodriguez, Feature Comment: An Analysis Of 
GAO’s 2018 Bid Protest Statistics—Regression Toward The Mean, 61 GC ¶ 35 
(analyzing the prior year’s statistics). See also, the materials at Chapter 10, as 
well as Christopher R. Yukins, Feature Comment: Administrative Conference 
Of The United States Launches Study Of Agency-Level Bid Protests, 61 GC ¶ 
239 (“The goal will be to develop recommendations regarding key aspects of 
agency-level bid protests, recommendations which the Administrative Con-
ference can put forward to make agency-level protests a more vital, efficient 
part of the federal procurement system.”).
F. Less Suspension and Debarment Activity? Following a trend 
begun in FY 2014, the total number of contractor suspension or debarment 
actions declined, (for a total of 480 suspensions, 1,542 proposed debarments, 
and 1,334 debarments). The Interagency Suspension and Debarment Com-
mittee (ISDC) reminds readers, however, that this activity is nearly double 
that reported in FY 2009, and that these numbers do not reflect the full 
scope of relevant activities, including “proactive engagements” by entities 
and individuals. ISDC FY 2018 Report On Suspensions, Debarments Shows 
Continued Downward Trend, 61 GC ¶ 329. (Note that the link to the official 
report was broken during the beta-SAM launch/conversion, discussed, supra.)
G. Looking Behind the Curtain: Contractor Ownership. Opaque 
ownership, or the use of shell companies, which obscures contractor owner-
ship, appears to have finally caught GAO and DoD’s attention and worked 
its way into the compliance narrative. Related concerns range from dis-
placement of small or disadvantaged firms, potentially disguised conflicts of 
interest, to foreign influence and control. GAO reported that “[DOD] faces 
several types of financial and nonfinancial fraud and national security risks 
posed by contractors with opaque ownership.” In other words, currently, “it 
[is] difficult for DOD to determine which entities and individuals ultimately 
own or control its contractors[.]” GAO-20-106, Defense Procurement: Ongoing 
DOD Fraud Risk Assessment Efforts Should Include Contractor Ownership 
(November 2019, public version of the more sensitive report to DoD), https://
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-106; DoD Needs to Assess Contractor Owner-
ship Fraud, 61 GC ¶ 355. See also, Proposed Rules Would Overhaul, Expand 
CFIUS Authority, 61 GC ¶ 279 (to comprehensively implement the Foreign 
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) and to better 
address national security concerns); GAO Weighs DOD Offshoring Risks And 
Benefits, 61 GC ¶ 267; GAO-19-516, Defense Supplier Base: Challenges and 
Policy Considerations Regarding Offshoring and Foreign Investment Risks, 
www.gao.gov/assets/710/701170.pdf. 
V. THE FUTURE OF SMALL BUSINESS CONTRACTING: TIME TO 
DISCUSS SME CONTRACTING? 
A. A middle ground? GAO raised a number of fascinating questions 
regarding the efficacy and future of small business procurement when it con-
cluded (consistent with what many assumed,) that “a very small percentage 
of the small businesses that were awarded set-aside contracts in fiscal year 
2008 grew to midsized in subsequent years and continued to receive any 
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type of contract.” Few Small Contractors Grow Into Mid-Sized Firms And 
Continue Receiving Contracts, GAO Finds, 61 GC ¶ 283; GAO-19-523, Federal 
Contracting: Awards to Mid-Sized Businesses and Options for Increasing Their 
Opportunities, www.gao.gov/assets/710/700999.pdf. For the most part, GAO 
seemed uninterested in the rest of the world’s procurement experience, where 
most other countries long have focused on SME’s (small and medium sized 
enterprises) rather than the US-system’s polar or rigidly binary universe 
of small and other-than-small. See, generally, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), SMEs in Public Procurement: Prac-
tices and Strategies for Shared Benefits (October 2018), https://www.oecd.org/
publications/smes-in-public-procurement-9789264307476-en.htm. See also, 
Franklin C. Turner, Alexander W. Major & Cara A. Wulf., Feature Comment: 
New Year, New Rules—Changes Are Coming To The FAR’s Small Business 
Subcontracting Limits And Nonmanufacturer Rule, 61 GC ¶ 20 (“[S]ince the 
passage of the 2013 NDAA, contractors and Government personnel alike 
have struggled to comply with an amalgam of inconsistent rules regarding 
the extent to which a small business may subcontract work under a federal 
small business set-aside contract.”) 
B. What’s the Goal, Anyway? Just meeting the goal? Although small 
business programs generally enjoy bipartisan support, small business advocates 
raise various procedural and eligibility complaints, while others more broadly 
question “the programs’ effectiveness, in terms of both promoting small business 
opportunities to win federal contracts and a more diversified, robust economy.” 
We remain skeptical that “the relative success or failure of federal efforts to en-
hance small business contracting opportunities [can best be assessed simply by 
determining] whether the federal government and individual federal agencies 
meet the [seemingly arbitrary] procurement goals in the annual Small Business 
Goaling Report.” CRS Surveys Criticism Of Small Business Programs, SBA Goals, 
61 GC ¶ 80; CRS Report R45576, An Overview of Small Business Contracting 
(July 3, 2019) https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45576. Still, it’s bet-
ter (for most contracting professionals) when the government meets (rather than 
fails to meet) the Congressionally-mandated goals. Government Meets FY 2018 
Small Business Goal With Record Sum, 61 GC ¶ 205 (“After failing to meet the 
Government-wide 23-percent goal for eight years, the Government has now met 
the goal in FYs 2013-2018.” Alas, not all was roses. “The Government missed its 
five- and three-percent goals for women-owned small businesses and Historically 
Underutilized Business Zone firms[.]”)
VI. THE LPTA SAGA ENDURES.
The primary sTaR waRs big screen triple-trilogy story-arc, which spanned 
an entire generation, may have run its course and reached its conclusion (or 
not), but DoD continues to keep the debate alive with regard to proper use of 
Lowest Price Technically Acceptable (LPTA) procurement in FAR and DFARS 
Part 15. ABA Section, PSC Calls for Harmonization of FAR, DFARS, LPTA 
Restrictions, 61 GC ¶ 359 (also discussing comments from Women Impacting 
Public Policy (WIPP) and the Project on Government Oversight (POGO)). 
FAR Rule On LPTA Process Will Not Be Enacted in Statutory Timeframe, 
61 GC ¶ 296 (“GAO found that DOD components used the LPTA process for 
about 25 percent of competitive contracts and orders valued at $5 million 
or more in FY 2018[, while o]nly seven percent of civilian agency contracts 
used the LPTA process.”); GAO-19-691, Federal Contracting: Information on 
Agencies’ Use of the Lowest Price Technically Acceptable Process, www.gao.
gov/assets/710/701773.pdf; Proposed FAR Rule Would Limit LPTA Use By 
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Civilian Agencies, 61 GC ¶ 298 (seeking to avoid, “to the maximum extent 
practicable, LPTA use for procuring certain knowledge-based services and 
supplies”); 84 Fed. Reg. 52425 (Oct. 2, 2019); DOD Should Harmonize LPTA 
Restrictions With FAR Council, Industry Group Says, 61 GC ¶ 38 (PSC ad-
vocates for application of the restrictions on LPTA use to services contracts 
government-wide).
VII. A BLEAK HORIZON SUGGESTS A BRIGHT FUTURE FOR 
SUSTAINABLE PROCUREMENT. 
The history of the federal government’s environmentally preferable or 
green procurement policies has been a rocky one, and, despite sporadic initia-
tives (including, most recently, Obama administration Executive Orders), still 
does not appear to feature prominently on the current procurement landscape. 
See, generally, FAR Part 23. With the new year, Australia’s experience – un-
precedented wild fires (across an area basically the size of the continental 
United States), military reserve deployments for firefighting, population dis-
placements, soot contamination of air and water, temperatures rising to 120 de-
grees Fahrenheit, and extinction-level threats to various species – potentially 
offers a sobering harbinger for the future of climate change. While we do not 
expect dramatic progress on initiatives to address these issues in 2020 (either 
here in the US or globally), it is only a matter of time until government(s) will 
need to exert leadership in this arena. At a minimum, we expect (again, at 
some point in the future) greater consideration of externalities (for example, 
emissions) as part of value for money or life cycle cost analysis in greater 
numbers of procurements. Outside the U.S., momentum is (slowly, labori-
ously) building around the need for more sustainable procurement, with the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) leading the 
organizational and thematic discussion with an eye towards seeking “policy 
coherence” on these issues. (Keep in mind that this sustainability agenda is 
much broader than “green procurement,” including many topics we typically 
consider social and economic policies, such as gender equality, but also many 
topics we consider “compliance-related,” such as bribery (and foreign cor-
rupt practices), human trafficking, and money laundering. “The Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) are broad and ambitious, calling on all countries 
– be they upper, middle or low income – to make tangible improvements to 
the lives of their citizens. The  goals  encompass social, environmental and 
economic aspects.”) http://www.oecd.org/dac/sustainable-development-goals.
htm; Green Public Procurement, https://www.oecd.org/gov/public-procurement/
green/. If you want to get ahead of the information curve, consider, among in-
numerable other options, Jason J. Czarnezki, Green Public Procurement: Legal 
Instruments for Promoting Environmental Interests in the United States and 
the European Union (Dissertation, Uppsala Universitet, 2019); International 
Monetary Fund, The Economics of Climate, fInanCe anD DevelopmenT (De-
cember 2019) (“Simply put, climate is the biggest risk the world faces. What 
can we do to move from talk to action?”), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/fandd/2019/12/pdf/fd1219.pdf; or DavID wallaCe-wells, The unInhaBITaBle 
eaRTh: lIfe afTeR Warming (2019).
VIII. A STRANGE DATAPOINT IN THE EVOLUTION OF  
ENHANCED DEBRIEFINGS. 
One of the issues we didn’t see coming in 2019 was a slice of the (most 
recent) protest of DoD’s JEDI cloud computing procurement, brought by dis-
appointed offeror Amazon Web Services (now proceeding in the U.S. Court of 
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Federal Claims, raising issues largely unrelated to the prior GAO and COFC 
protests previously brought by Oracle). Part of that protest complains about 
the manner in which DoD conducted Amazon’s post-award debriefing. Among 
other things, the (redacted) complaint alleges:
Despite the significance of the JEDI procurement - which had been 
years in the making and had a potential ceiling of $10 billion - on 
the same day DOD announced its award decision, DoD provided 
AWS a written debriefing ... and advised AWS that it had two 
business days to submit written questions based on the debriefing, 
foreclosing the opportunity for AWS to request and receive an 
in-person debriefing….
DoD [then] failed to provide reasonable responses to relevant 
questions about whether source selection procedures contained 
in the solicitation, applicable regulation, and other applicable 
authorities were followed, … In fact, DoD did not provide a 
substantive response to a single one of the 265 questions that 
AWS timely submitted, leaving AWS in the dark about DoD’s 
explanations for the substantive issues for which AWS raised 
concern in the debriefing questions.
See (redacted) complaint, Amazon Web Services, Inc. v. U.S., Case 1:19-cv-
01796-PEC (Filed December 9, 2019) Section G, pages 89, et seq. (emphasis 
added); Jared Serbu, Why DoD may have given Amazon every reason to protest 
JEDI, feDeRal news neTwoRk (December 18, 2019). See also, Amazon Files 
Protest With COFC Against DOD JEDI Cloud Award, 61 GC ¶ 340. Granted, 
at this point, these are mere allegations, but it sounds like the debriefing 
following DoD’s high-value, high-profile procurement is more likely to serve 
as a lesson learned or case study than a model for other DoD contracting 
officials, particularly in light of increased expectations associated with “en-
hanced debriefings.” We are reminded of the first recommendation from the 
2018 RAND Bid Protest report:
A major concern from the private sector is the quality of post-award 
debriefings. The consensus among companies is that the quality 
and number of post-award debriefings vary significantly. The worst 
debriefings were characterized as being skimpy, adversarial, and 
evasive or as failing to provide required reasonable responses to 
relevant questions. In desperation, unsuccessful offerors may 
submit a bid protest to obtain government documents that delineate 
the rationale for the contract award.… [I]n most cases, too little 
information and evasive/adversarial debriefings will lead to a bid 
protest. Our recommendation is to consider having DoD adopt a 
debriefing process similar to the U.S. Air Force’s extended briefing 
process. 
Mark V. Arena, et al., RAND, Assessing Bid Protests of U.S. Department of 
Defense Procurements: Identifying Issues, Trends, and Drivers, https://www.
rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2356.html; see also, DoD Class-Deviation 
2018-O011, Enhanced Postaward Debriefing Rights (March 22, 2018), https://
www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/USA000563-18-DPAP.pdf; Joseph R. 
Berger, Feature Comment: Developments Affecting DOD Bid Protests, 61 GC 
¶ 113 (“With new debriefing procedures and other potential future improve-
ments, DOD may be leading the way toward better debriefings Government-
wide.… Unsuccessful offerors on contracts with DOD can use the newly 
adopted procedures to obtain valuable and necessary information to help 
them better understand the agency’s reasoning and decision, why they lost 
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the competition and how they can improve their proposals, and whether there 
is a valid basis for a bid protest.”) More broadly, DoD’s JEDI cloud comput-
ing procurement-and-protest saga continues, in an extraordinary example 
of a procurement where, among other things, two major competitors both 
alleged (at different stages of the process) the existence of dramatic, facially 
compelling, case study-worthy conflicts of interest. See, e.g., Developments: 
DOD Awards JEDI Cloud Contract to Microsoft, Bypassing Amazon, Oracle, 
61 GC ¶ 324(d); New Defense Secretary To Review JEDI Procurement, 61 GC 
¶ 232; Oracle Was Not Prejudiced By Alleged Errors In JEDI Procurement, 
COFC Holds, 61 GC ¶ 230; Oracle Am., Inc. v. U.S., 2019 WL 3385953 (Fed. 
Cl. July 19, 2019) (currently on appeal, 61 GC ¶ 268(f)), but see, Ralph C. 
Nash, Hiring A Member of the Source Selection Team: Not A Recommended 
Practice, 33 N&CR ¶ 54 (“If you asked any knowledgeable person whether a 
company should hire a member of the Government source selection team in 
the middle of a competition, you would get a resounding NO!”); Comp. Gen. 
Denies Oracle Protest Of Single-Award Approach For JEDI Cloud IDIQ, 61 
GC ¶ 8; Oracle Am., Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-416657 et al., 2018 CPD ¶ 391.
